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Tab C

By isb, NARS, Date 7-18-79

Draft Instruction for Emissary to Saigon

43

You will make an independent assessment of the military and political situation, with special reference to the following.

1. The situation of the ARVN, including the RF and PF.

--- How many of the 50% who were on leave during Tet have returned?

--- What measures are being taken to assemble the rest?

--- With maximum effort, how rapidly could the rest be assembled?

--- What is the situation with respect to the RF and PF?

What efforts are being undertaken to reestablish their links with the central government and to insure that they hold a maximum part of the countryside and engage, along with ARVN forces, in exploiting the possible weakness in certain areas of Viet Cong, guerrilla and provincial main force units?

-- How soon can Hue and Saigon be thoroughly cleaned up?

-- When are the weak corps commanders, divisional commanders, and province chiefs to be removed?

-- What is the earliest possible date when they can get through the new provisions for drafting of 18 and 19 year olds?

-- In the light of the changed situation, does some redeployment of U.S. forces within South Vietnam make sense? For example, ^{DoD} movement of some battalions of the 9th Division out of the Delta make sense?

2. In general, you will convey the view from Washington that the enemy is putting us to the maximum military test of which he is now capable. He may have other surprises for us aside from the scale and weight of the attack on the cities. He may be planning to achieve a situation of maximum advantage and then try to force us into a negotiation on his terms. It therefore seems essential to us that every military and political resource inside South Vietnam be pushed to the limit, not merely to survive his attacks but to present to the enemy and the world a picture of:

-- Military initiative with respect to both the cities and the countryside;

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-2-

- Political vitality on the part of the government; and
- Maximum political unity between the government and non-Communist political groups.

3. In talking with Thieu and Ky, you should make clear that we wish to see it through at their side. If we are to be permitted to do so by American public opinion, they must move fast to bring their forces back to strength; wherever possible to get the forces ^{now} under direct pressure into an active role to exploit the weakened position of the enemy; to assure that those who did not perform well in the current crisis are promptly replaced; to exploit the present crisis for a ruthless attack on corruption; to reestablish total security in the cities.

The enemy is obviously involved in a do-or-die offensive. He may confront us soon with a diplomatic offensive. No one can do the job for the Vietnamese that must be done in the days ahead. They must do it for themselves. If the Vietnamese can act with political and military vigor, we can stay together and turn the enemy's urban offensive to our advantage.

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